Abstract
Introduction
International soccer matches have been often related to political relations. If we consider Koreas, in September 10, 2008, the national soccer teams of Korea Democratic Popular Republic and Korea Republic were to play their match for the 2 nd stage group qualification of the World Cup 2010 at the Shanghai Hongkou Stadium in China. The match was to be played on neutral site. The choice was determined due to political reasons: North Koreans are not willing to play the South Korean anthem and to display its flag on their own territory. A more striking political accident occurred between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and it has been popularized by Kapuściński (1991) . It ended up in the so called "Soccer War". Moreover, in 1986 at the World Cup, when the English national soccer team had been eliminated at the quarter-final stage by Argentina, many observers recalled the political hostility between the two nations because of the MalvinasFalkland war.
Briefly, the importance of soccer appears to go beyond the sport competition. In many cases, nationalism emerges when national teams take part into major soccer international competitions.
Moreover, some sociological approaches consider a soccer match has the stylization of a war in other battlefields (Elias and Dunning, 1986) . That kind of approach was largely used to interpret the violent phenomena related to soccer, as hooliganism (Caruso and Di Domizio, 2012; Leeson et al., 2012) . Less attention has been paid to the «potential» role of political and economic interactions in determining the aggressive attitude of players on the pitch.
Our paper investigates if and how diplomatic and trade relations among countries reverberate on the soccer pitch. The empirical analysis focuses on matches played by national teams in the final phases of the European and World Cup since 2000. In order to study the emergence of aggressiveness, as dependent variable, we use the number of yellow and red cards (namely the pitch penalties) received by players as a proxy of their aggressiveness. Then, we estimate a regression equation including political and economic variables. Since the dependent variable is a count, the empirical models are estimated by means of Negative Binomial Regressions with Maximum Likelihood techniques. Once the sport control variables were added in the regression, results show that diplomatic and trade relations, together with power and education asymmetry are significantly associated with players' aggressiveness on the pitch. Moreover, sport covariates show the expected signs, such as the closeness of the teams, their ranking and the stage of the game (knockout stages) are also crucial in determining the penalties on the pitch.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 describes the role of violence in sport contexts and particularly in the football environment; section 2 discusses data set composition and the variables used in the empirical investigation. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and discusses the results; section 4 concludes.
Soccer-related violence: an overview
The relationship between sport and violence has been widely debated in judicial, sociological and economic literature, particularly for soccer (Giulianotti et al., 1994; Dunning, 1999) . Many factors contribute to make soccer a stage for violent episodes: it mimics a conflict, it is a team sport and it is also associated with a shared sense of community. This is why Elias and Dunning (1986) claim that soccer matches stylize and miniaturize the war. This approach evidently takes into account the idea according to which violence cannot be removed from the sport environment. Different interpretations have been produced to explain such a relevant presence of violence in a sport/soccer context. For example Bandura (1973) considers the violence as a consequence of the frustration generated by a defeat, while Dunning (1999) explains that aggressiveness associated to soccer matches is basically masculinity, territorial struggle and excitement. Following the latter idea, the attention was mainly devoted to the analysis of the hooliganism phenomenon, originated in modern time from the United Kingdom and spread in almost all of European countries (Spaaij, 2008) . Other contributions incorporate actions of hooligans in a framework of rational behaviour also in order to identify the optimal counter strategy implemented by governments (Poutvaara and Priks, 2009; Marie, 2011) .
The presence of violence in a sport context is also consistent with the multi-shaped interpretation of sport as expounded by Caruso (2008; , who extends the definition presented by Downward and Riordan (2007) and builds on Boulding's contributions (1973; 1978 That is, sport has a multiple nature so implying that the social outcome emerging from sport would depend on intensity of the different elements. Particularly, when the relational nature of sport dominates the other components, the relationship with violence may be reversed and a beneficial effect of sport participation can be envisioned. Caruso (2011) tested this idea by studying the negative relationship between sport and crime. This could support the idea of the appropriate role of sport to prevent violent behaviour and promote individual and community development. In spite of this potential benefit, the multi-shaped definition mentioned above, takes into account some violent and aggressive components of sport. Sport can involve threat, coercion, aggressive behaviour and extreme competition. This is not a novelty. Consider some examples drawn from history. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet bloc organized their sport system through security and armed forces. Most sport heroes were soldiers or police officers. Sport was designed to control the society (Howell, 1975; Cooper, 1989; Riordan, 1993) . Needless to say, sport was also interpreted as ancillary to foreign policy. In fact, success in sport was intended to support USSRand other socialist countries to gain international prestige (Riordan, 1974) .
Recently, researchers began to use sport to empirically disentangle the effect of culture, institutions and poverty in determining violent behaviour inside the pitch. For example Miguel et al. (2008) analysed the relationship between violent behaviour of the single player on the football pitch and the history of civil conflict in the player's provenance, using data from the major six professional European football leagues. They used the number of yellow and red cards attributed by referees to the players and, after the introduction of sport, economic and geographical control variables, they included the number of years passed after a civil war between 1980 and 2005. They found a strong relationship between the latter explanatory variable and the number of yellow and red cards, supporting the idea that the national culture and identity influence the violent attitude of players on the pitch. Different results are presented by Cuesta and Bohórquez (2012) in their empirical investigation on Copa Libertadores. 1 Taking into account a broader concept of national culture, they contested the number of years passed after a civil war as a measure of violence in a country. Adding other variables in order to approximate the violent attitude of each country, such as the years of dictatorship, the homicides rate, the number of years of armed conflict within each country and the related homicides rate, have shown that the violent behaviour of players depends exclusively on soccer characteristics, and that their nationality is not significant as far as their violent behaviour on the pitch is concerned.
In what follows, we focus on the aggressive behaviour emerging on the pitch at the match level. In particular, we contribute to the existing literature by empirically investigating the relevance of political, diplomatic, education and economic linkages between countries involved in the match under investigation, on the sanctions attributed by the referee on the soccer pitch, namely yellow and red cards.
The variables
The empirical analysis covers the period 2000-2012, and focuses on matches of World Cups and Euro Championships. We concentrate on the final phases instead of qualifying rounds in order to avoid any potential bias on the dependent variable determined by the home field influence on referees (Nevill et al., 2002 The dependent variable is labelled Aggressiveness and it denotes the number of sanctions attributed by the referee to the players during the match. 2 It is computed as follows:
The dependent variable needs some explanation. First, we pay our attention on referees' sanctions instead of fouls committed because the latter are not homogeneous and available for all matches. At the same time, needless to say, there is a strong positive correlation between the actual number of fouls committed and the number of yellow and red cards. Briefly, the number of cards may be considered a good approximation of the aggressiveness on the field. Secondly, we prefer to weigh the referee cautions in order to take into account that the second yellow card, usually, is rewarded for some more serious foul than those which have determined the first sanction. Anyway, it is less serious than those that determined a single direct red card. In fact, this is confirmed by the fact that the second yellow card does not imply a disqualification of the player for one or more of future matches. 3 Note that we have not made distinctions between yellow and red card received because of violent behaviour and those received for other irregular conducts. For example it is possible that one player receives yellow/red card because of verbal protest or for excess of elation, but that distinction is not included in our dependent variable identification. The list of independent explanatory variables includes economic, political, education and sports data. One group focuses on the relationship between countries. In particular, we take into account some measure of hostility both in terms of commercial and political-diplomatic relations. Hereafter, commercial hostility is defined as the attitude of the economy of country A to penetrate in the economy of country B. Such idea is drawn from that explained by Hirschmann (1945 Hirschmann ( /1980 according to which trade can be interpreted as a source of power and influence between countries. Then, we calculated, for each dyad of countries, two penetration indexes able to capture that attitude; the penetration index for the country A is computed as the ratio between exports from country A to B, divided by the total imports of country B. The same we do for the penetration index of country B (exports from country B to country A divided by total imports of country A). 4 At the end, we select the highest index among the two as the proxy of our measure of Commercial Hostility variable. It is bounded between 0 and 1, and we expect a positive sign of the associated coefficient. In addition, we introduce a dummy variable, Diplomatic Hostility, to capture the level of diplomatic relations between the countries. This dummy is constructed on information drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) Diplomatic Exchange data set. 5 The dyadic data set describes the level of diplomatic exchange between members in the COW system at the level of chargé d'affaires, minister, and ambassador between members of the interstate system. 6 The dummy equals 1 when the level of diplomatic exchange in the period considered is above 3 (the maximum diplomatic representation in the other country), indicating potential tensions between countries, and 0 otherwise). We use the diplomatic relations recorded for the period 1995-2005. We also introduce a variable to evaluate power gap among countries by means of the National Material Capability data set. 7 The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) summarizes the power of each country using data on total and urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure. 8 The variable included in the regression is the absolute value of difference of CINC for the countries involved (CINC Difference). We expect a positive sign of the coefficient because we can suppose that the football match may be seen as an opportunity of revenge for countries with less power. Put differently, such redemption chance could be instilled into the national football teams forcing the players to a more aggressive behavior on the pitch.
Eventually, we introduce a control variable approximating the education gap between countries. The variable is calculated as the ratio between the enrolments in secondary education expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. 9 The expectation is for a positive sign of the associated coefficient, and the explanation may be based on the same ground of the previous hostility variables.
A second group includes sport variables. First, we consider the closeness of the game since it should influence the level of aggressiveness and, as a consequence, the number of fouls and referees' sanctions. To capture that, we introduce the variable Ranking Difference, that is, the absolute value of the difference between the FIFA World Ranking of each team. 10 We do not formulate unidirectional expectation on the sign of the coefficient. On one hand, if a match is balanced, it could be harsher. On the other hand, when the ranking difference increases, the underdog team may behave more aggressively to reduce the distance in sport talent. A possible alternative measure of the closeness of the game may be introduced using the points attributed by the FIFA in order to list its official ranking. Then, the variable Points Difference measures the absolute value of the difference in points achieved by each team in the FIFA World Ranking. 11 Moreover, we introduce a dummy (World Cup) to denote whether the match has been played in the World Cup tournament. The dummy Knockout Stage denotes whether the match is a tie-match or not. The expectation is for a positive sign of associated coefficients to both variables. Another dummy variable (Hosting Country) is added to the data set to highlight matches played by the national team of the country hosting the competition. This has been made in order to take into account the potential home field bias determined by the referee subjection in distributing sanctions (Dawson et al., 2007) and secondly to catch the likely agonistic over-fierceness of the national teams players of the hosting country inflamed by local supporters. To take into account referees' attitudes, we introduce a dummy (Peripheral) which is 1 if the referee do not come from major federations, namely UEFA and CONMEBOL. 12 This variable tries to catch the potential bias in the yellow and red cards distribution determined by the lower opportunity of referees coming from peripheral federations (such as AFC, CAF, CONCACAF and OFC) to face with high level matches during the regular season. 13 Eventually, we introduce other dummy variables: (1) the first (Over time) captures matches ended up in overtime; (2) some geographical dummies (Africa, Asia and Oceania) that indicate matches involving teams from Africa, Asia and Oceania, respectively. These dummies are introduced to consider the different approach that teams from peripheral areas, on the soccer perspective, may have respect to those coming from the core of football dominance located in the South America and Europe. Descriptive statistics of variables are presented in table 2. Figure 1 illustrates the density function of the dependent variable Aggressiveness. As showed by figure 1 the dependent variable is far to be considered normally distributed, and the same is for the hypothesis of a log-normal distribution. To confirm, tests on the hypothesis of the normality distribution on Aggressiveness and on its logarithm were performed. Results are shown in table 3. 
The empirical strategy
Considering the characteristics of the dependent variable as specified in the tables 3 and 4, we use a Negative Binomial Regression (Verbeek, 2004; Green, 2008 Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance:***>99%, **>95%, *>90%.
Note that we follow the previous econometric literature leaving out the constant from the regression equation. LR and Wald tests confirm the joint statistical significance of the (first group) variables associated to commercial hostility, diplomatic relationships, international leadership recognition and education gap. The log-likelihood values suggest preferring the NEG BIN II model to the NEG BIN I; for this reason, we comment only the first. Considering the variables of the first group we note that they have all a positive impact on Aggressiveness. First, being a continue variable ranged between 0 and 1, we can calculate that an increase of one percentage point in the Commercial Hostility implies an increase by 1.4 percentage points in the conditional average of Aggressiveness. It is the same for the variable CINC Difference and for the Education gap for which each increase in one point determines an increase of conditional average of Aggressiveness of 5.2 and 0.54 percentage points respectively. Considering the Diplomatic Hostility, when political tensions between countries are registered by our dummy variable, the conditional average of Aggressiveness increases of 35% respect to matches played between countries with regular relations.
As expected, the sport-related variables are significant in determining the level of aggressiveness on the pitch. In particular, for knockout matches and for those of the World Cup, the expected level of aggressiveness increases, on average (ceteris paribus), of about 36.5% and 64.9% respectively. A negative correlation appears between the closeness of the match and the expected Aggressiveness, supporting the idea that the underdog team exhibits more aggressive attitude on the pitch even if the marginal effect is not so strong. The magnitude of the coefficient of regression associated to the Ranking Difference means that a one unit rise in the absolute difference in the FIFA World Ranking between teams produces an increase in the conditional average of Aggressiveness of 0.01. According to the dummy variable, Hosting Country, its related coefficient is significant and has the expected sign. From our regression it emerges that, when the national team of the hosting country is involved in the match, the conditional average of Aggressiveness increases about 48.3%. Statistical significance emerges from the dummies associated to football peripheral with the exclusion of Oceania; according to our econometric investigation when teams from Asia and Africa play, the aggressiveness on the pitch reduces about 23.2 and 44.9, respectively. At the end no statistical effect on aggressiveness may be attributed to the matches ended in over-time and those referred by referees from peripheral federations.
Conclusion
The main result we would claim for this paper is that political hostility between countries affect and shape behaviour of players on soccer pitch. In particular, the empirical findings show that the players' aggressiveness is positively related to some political variables. In fact, we considered as dependent variable the number of yellow and red cards (the pitch penalties) as a proxy of the players' aggressiveness and estimated a regression equation including political, education and sport variables. The analysis focused on international matches played by national teams in the Euro Championships and World Cup tournaments for the period 2000-2012. Since the dependent variable is an event count, we used a Negative Binomial regression. Results show that the coefficient associated to the variable approximating the commercial hostility between countries is of statistical significance and positive. The same is for variable capturing the diplomatic tension and the education gap. A significant association is also shown for a variable constructed to capture the different level of power among countries. To summarize, we find that (a) the commercial hostility, (b) the level of diplomatic relationships, (c) the power gap between countries, and (d) education gap are positively and significantly associated to players' aggressiveness on the soccer pitch. That is, briefly stated, international hostility reverberates into the pitch. These results enrich the evidence provided by Miguel et al. (2008) and Cuesta and Bohórquez (2012) . Differently from these papers, our work in particular, focuses more on international relations rather than internal conflict or violence. In this way, we capture how soccer can be interpreted as a way for revenge of national pride with respect to other countries.
Finally, our result may be appraised in both political and sport perspectives. First of all, we confirm that the approaches which consider football matches as a battle are not so far from the truth, in particular for national teams playing in the major football competitions. Secondly, we can hypothesize a possible reduction of the aggressiveness on the pitch in the future international competitions since the process of football globalization is going to reduce the inequalities in the skills of football players all over the world (Milanovic, 2005) . To conclude, we can formulate a suggestion for international football associations to well consider both football and political factors when the soccer agenda is going to be filled in, especially for the organization of international competitions and the scheduling of qualifying matches, in order to reduce the potential aggressiveness on the pitch. Details about data set and its use in the literature on international diplomatic relations in Small and Singer (1966; and Small (1977) . 7
Notes
The data set is provided by the Correlates of War organization on its official web site (NMC version 4) and refers to the pioneering contribution of Singer et al. (1972) and Singer (1987 
